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Abstract 
Several evaluations have been conducted to assess the impact of agricultural input subsidies in 
Malawi but have been mostly either descriptive or qualitatively inferred of the intervention impacts 
on the overall goal of the subsidy program. In most studies cited in this paper their approaches do 
not control for misspecification errors that might arise due to selection bias. One common 
erroneous approach is the lack of controlling for treatment effects. In this study we employ quasi-
experimental econometric techniques using propensity scores to control for selection bias by 
creating control groups for those individuals that benefit from agricultural input subsidies. The study 
utilizes raw household data from two surveys conducted through the Malawi National Statistical 
Office in 2004/05 and 2006/07 production seasons. A household model for each dataset is estimated 
together with Average Treatment Effects on the Treated to assess the impact of targeted fertilizer 
input subsidies in 2004/05 and a refined program adopted in 2006/07 production periods. The 
evidence suggest that the starter pack or targeted input program implemented before 2004/05 
focusing on one tenth of a hectare had a significant negative impact on household food expenditures 
compared to the refined program in 2006/07 that targeted about half a hectare for marginalized 
smallholder farmers. The latter, though portraying mostly insignificant results, showed positive 
impacts on household food expenditures. The approach adopted also proposes ways in which policy 
makers can effectively and independently evaluate the impact of public programs on social and 
economic welfare.  
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Almost 85% of Malawi’s population belongs to farm (peasant) households and agricultural 
production and productivity are often importantly dependent on their performance as farmers. 
Malawi, being labor intensive, the importance of these farmers is often underestimated and 
understanding the determinants of their welfare, functionality of markets in their communities 
and which interventions are more effective in improving their livelihoods are of vital 
importance both to Government and policy makers. Understanding this approach helps policy 
makers in developing strategies of poverty alleviation that seek to address all problems faced 
by peasant farmers.  
However, once such strategies are developed they are faced with lack of sustainability partly 
because there is failure to understand how agrarian institutions work and how to promote 
such agrarian societies up the life cycle ladder. Some of these problems arise due to lack of 
an understanding that peasant households are single institutions where decisions are made 
holistically on production, consumption and reproduction over time (Sadoulet and de Janvry, 
1995). These decisions require the functioning of markets within and outside their social 
stratum.  
In this case, the problem to be solved is two-fold: one need to understand why households are 
always semi-commercialized in the sense that, even when markets are working, they still 
keep part of their production for home consumption or utilize part of their household labor 
for their own use. Secondly, on the markets, one needs to understand why markets fail in 
forming backward and forward linkages to the household entity. As we will see in later 
sections, the failure to comprehend these two important questions necessitates the 
formulation of poor policies that do not maximize the utility of the householder’s social 
welfare function.  
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This failure is partly attributed to erratic prices for different agricultural commodities and 
lack of information whereby supply and demand schedules are always going in opposite 
directions. In an ideal world where all markets work, linkages between production and 
consumption decisions are found at the level of income (capitalist market). When not all 
markets are functioning, the forward and backward linkages do not exist and interrelations 
are directly related to production and consumption decisions. It is the latter that affect most 
Malawian farmers and the impact of most Government-led interventions targeting the poor 
household are met with a complex set of problems that make the programs/projects 
unsustainable. For instance, a program may target farmers in rural areas by providing 
irrigation equipment but if no market exists for the produce, the program becomes 
unsustainable.  
The agricultural system in Malawi is seasonal and several months in a given year are left idle 
or farmers have to seek alternative ways of generating income for their survival. Government 
interventions in this case become very important to boost the income of the household in lean 
periods. Government either would initiate a public works program or provide safety nets that 
target marginalized smallholder households. However, the creation of favorable markets has 
been overlooked and the emphasis on social programs have derailed government’s role of 
creating a macroeconomic environment suitable for private-sector led growth towards 
targeting the income function of the poor. This becomes unsustainable and wrought to 
underrate government’s facilitative role.  
The study objectives, therefore, are twofold. The first one seeks to evaluate government 
interventions using quasi-experimental econometric or treatment evaluation techniques that 
focus on evaluating periodic panel datasets with the aim of assessing intervention effects on 
the goal of a given program. Secondly, to provide evidence that focusing more on programs 
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or interventions aiming at correcting market failures outweigh the importance of short-term 
interventions to selected households.  
The sections of the paper are as follows: section 2 explores the background of government 
policies in Malawi including interventions adopted. Section 3 looks at literature review. 
Section 4 outlines the methodology to be adopted in this paper. Section 5 looks at results and 
findings. Lastly, section 6 concludes and provides recommendations for future policy 
interventions.  
2.0 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
Since 1964 when Malawi attained her independence from the British Protectorate, 
government policy formulation was guided by central planning strategies aimed at promoting 
sustained economic growth and transforming the nation from a poor country to a relatively 
middle-income, industrialized, nation. The paradigm of development economics during the 
1960s was Rostow’s (1960) growth theory that focused primarily on the agricultural sector. 
The agricultural sector was seen as the ‘take off’ point towards an industrialized nation and 
the top priority for the Malawi Government was to raise agricultural productivity (DEVPOL; 
1971-80)
1
. In Malawi between 1974 and 1979 this approach resulted in an average real gross 
domestic product growth of 6.0% per annum.  
The key driver during this period was the agricultural sector that benefited from subsidized 
inputs such as fertilizer through state-owned enterprises. The emphasis on agriculture was 
based on the comparative advantage paradigm in that Malawi was seen to have abundant 
natural resources (land) and a bulk of labor supply. The obvious logic was then to follow 
labor-intensive production techniques so that the country could reap its benefits from 
                                                          
1
 DEVPOL refers to ‘The Statement of Development Policies in Malawi, a document prepared by then the Office 
of the President and Cabinet, Economic Planning Division.  
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utilizing fully both its abundant labor and natural resources. Additional investments to 
support the growth theory and address market failures were to improve on infrastructure 
development especially on transport and commercial markets paving the way for private 
sector development.  
The industrial structure in the 1970s comprised of Parastatals or Government/state-owned 
companies with the aim of adding-value to the raw produce made by smallholder farmers. 
Examples of such companies include the Agricultural Development and Marketing 
Corporation (ADMARC) who owned some processing plants such as cotton ginneries; the 
Press Corporation Limited, who owned several companies in fisheries, bakery, and sugar 
processing (ethanol); Grain and Milling Company that processed maize and other leguminous 
plants, among others.  
As a prerequisite for future development of transforming the country from a peasant economy 
to an industrialized country, the Malawi government in the 1970s laid foundations on the 
fiscal front and significant achievements where realized. These included a rapid reduction in 
the budgetary deficit and reliance on foreign budgetary aid. The overarching performance 
was partly a result of sound macroeconomic management by the government due to 
controlled government budget deficits averaging 10.0% of GDP, low inflation, good and 
reliable weather conditions, and ready export markets of key agricultural exports such as 
tobacco, tea and sugar on the international scene (DEV POL, 1987-96).  
The trickle down effect from such an approach was that government believed the rate of 
agricultural growth would largely determine and feed into the rate of growth in the 
manufacturing sector. In other words, there were backward and forward linkages to be 
realized by creating vertically integrated industries and the productivity of smallholder 
farmers was significant to such developments. However, the Malawi Government envisaged 
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that such agricultural projects would only affect directly a minority of the population 
(smallholder farmers) and that even less people would be able to find an appropriate wage 
employment (DEVPOL, 1971-80) – a decision in my own view that first created the problems 
that Malawi is currently facing. This moved the emphasis from private-sector led growth 
towards a more socially oriented policy with special emphasis on poverty alleviation as 
opposed to poverty reduction through necessary means.  
The structure of the industrial base was categorized into food processing, textiles, tobacco 
and tea processing and there were improvements in capacity utilization and profitability in 
almost all firms (DEVPOL, 1987-96). To support these improvements, the Malawi 
Government had made important developments that were necessary and vital for private 
sector development in the 1970s and included the construction of new and improved roads, a 
new railway line, a hydro-electric scheme and a university for human resource development 
(DEVPOL, 1971-80). The constraint at this stage, however, was that the industrial base was 
still in its infant stage and comprised of a small number of firms that were either controlled 
by parastatals or multinational companies that needed some form of government protection.  
Nevertheless, no significant investments such as roads, electricity, water and information, 
communication and technology (ICT) were made to attract private firms to invest in rural 
areas where the hub of most agro-processing resided. As of 2004, the poverty headcount 
based on kilocalorie household expenditures was at 45.39% (48.49% in rural areas). Access 
to electricity still remained negligible of which only 6% of the national population had access 
to electricity for lighting (less than 2% in rural areas) and less than 2% (0.36% in rural areas) 
used electricity for cooking. Access to better roads was also marginal representing 17% in 
rural areas.  
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Table 1: Household Basic Statistics based on IHS2 Data – 2004/05 
 Statistic 
Percent 
 
National Rural Urban 
Poverty based on kilocalorie 
household expenditures 
Headcount Ratio 45.39 48.49 22.57 
Extreme Poverty Headcount Ratio 11.18 12.16 3.95 
Access to Electricity 
for lighting 5.67 1.88 31.60 
for cooking 1.59 0.36 10.00 
Access to Roads 
Tar/Asphalt Graded 14.94 16.97 1.04 
Graveled 21.25 14.81 65.28 
Dirt Road (Maintained) 44.60 48.57 17.50 
Dirt Track 19.21 19.65 16.18 
 
The DEVPOL (1987-96) recognized that the most significant economic development in the 
1970s was the acceleration of instability and insecurity of the Malawian economy mainly 
from external shocks and concerns were now towards stabilization policies. In the early 
1980s most African countries began to adopt the World Bank (WB)/International Monetary 
Fund (IMF or the Fund) Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) and Poverty Alleviation 
Programmes (PAP) designed to provide loans to affected less developed countries to mitigate 
the consequences of the aftermath of the shocks (Tarp, 1993; Franses, 1995).  
With pressures from international financial institutions, Malawi liberalized the input markets 
to some degree as part of the structural adjustment programs (SAPs) propagated by the 
Washington Consensus. In the mid-1990s Malawi eliminated universal fertilizer subsidies for 
smallholder farmers only to see a reintroduction of the program with limited subsidies in 
1998 through the ‘Starter Pack program’. This gave smallholder farmers, free of charge, 10-
15 kg of fertilizer and enough hybrid seed to cultivate approximately 0.1 hectares of farm 
size. In 2001, the Starter Pack program was downgraded to a Targeted Input Program which 
distributed the same quantities of fertilizer and seed to groups of targeted farmers.  
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Current Policies in Malawi 
The economic history of the Malawian economy since independence can be summarized in 
three stages: the first period (1964-1980) is regarded as a period of ‘economic growth with 
trickle down effects’. The second period (1980-1996) was a period of ‘economic growth with 
poverty alleviation’. The third period (1996-2004) economic paradigm was that of ‘poverty 
reduction and empowerment’ which was implemented through the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy (PRS) concept propagated by the Breton Woods Institutions.  
At the completion point for the Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy (MPRS) in 2003/4, the 
Malawi Government replaced the MPRS with the Malawi Economic Growth Strategy 
(MEGS). The MEGS was designed after government realized that the MPRS pillar of rapid 
sustainable pro-poor growth did not lead to sustainable economic growth. The MEGS was 
implemented in 2004 and the economy was still susceptible to external shocks such as 
weather, changes in terms of trade, oil shocks, political developments and fluctuations in 
foreign aid. Instead, MEGS accentuated on private sector development focusing primarily on 
spreading the risk in key sectors such as agriculture (tobacco, tea, coffee, cotton, etc.), 
mining, tourism and manufacturing.  
To consolidate the MEGS government in 2005 designed the Malawi Growth and 
Development Strategy (MGDS) in order to incorporate social policy issues. The MGDS is a 
five-year strategic plan (2006-2011) that comprises of two parts; the ‘growth’ strategy, which 
emphasizes creating conducive environment for private sector development, and the 
‘development’ strategy, focusing on social factors. The main agenda of the MGDS is to 
revive the economy through sustainable economic growth and infrastructure development 
targeted to create wealth and reduce poverty that Malawi has faced for several decades.  
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3.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
It has been noted that different researchers often ask the wrong questions and use wrong 
methodologies when assessing agricultural empirical questions that target the poor or less 
privileged in any given society. In any assessment of a public program or intervention 
seeking to improve a given social welfare function of the disadvantaged groups, it is 
important to ask the question whether the targeted beneficiaries were better or worse off after 
the intervention was implemented. It becomes irrelevant, in my view, to consider the cost 
implications of such interventions especially when the intervention proved to be a success. 
With regard to the second Pareto Optimality principle
2, Government’s role is to redistribute 
wealth and if such distribution is done in a transparent and accountable manner without 
making other players worse off that would be an added advantage. On the issue of 
methodology, Lalonde (1986) argues that standard non-experimental techniques such as 
regression, fixed effects, and latent-variable selection models are either inaccurate or 
sensitive to model specification.  
Other researchers have attempted to compare smallholder farmers with commercial farmers 
in which those who received subsidized fertilizers have been compared with yield responses 
of farmers who pay commercial prices (Ricker-Gilbert et. al, 2009). This depicts a lack of 
understanding of how smallholder households behave. According to Sadoulet and de Janvry 
(1995), on one hand, smallholder farmers are usually semi-commercialized and usually 
production is at a subsistence level. They only sell if they have excess production and this 
depends on their production and consumption needs.  
                                                          
2
 The second theorem of welfare economics states that if all consumers have convex preferences and all firms 
have convex production possibility sets, any Pareto efficient allocation can be achieved as the equilibrium of a 
complete set of competitive markets after a suitable redistribution of initial endowments (Gravelle and Rees, 
2004) 
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Secondly, for one to make such a comparative analysis it has to be done at a similar level 
playing field. For instance, access to effective and efficient agricultural extension services, 
educational programs, market and transport systems and credit markets are vital and 
necessary components if we are to compare commercial and smallholder farmers. 
Commercial farmers are usually strategically positioned and can easily access these basic 
services. They usually have access to skilled personnel that are well conversant with latest 
technologies of improving agricultural production. As such, utility functions for smallholder 
and commercial farmers are incomparable.  
Therefore, arguments that assume that smallholder farmers who receive subsidized inputs at 
discounted prices through the Government may obtain similar output responses as 
commercial farmers may be an assumption that does not reflect reality. This hypothesis on its 
own is an oversimplification and would lead to gross measurement errors and model 
misspecification. This approach would and has always led to the non-acceptance on the use 
of input subsidies and thus has confused policy makers and development partners of the need 
to subsidize inputs to the underprivileged or marginalized groups.  
It also follows that a smallholder farmer will only have an incentive to use a productive asset 
as efficiently as possible regardless of the purchasing price if and only if the farmer has 
access to the same conditions faced by commercial farmers. In this case, access to 
knowledge, information and years spent on education become important. Some studies, for 
example, have found that fixed costs (distant to market) and variable costs (price per unit) 
may affect market participation (Key et al, 2000; Bellemare et al, 2006). Others have also 
shown that access to credit and insurance may be constraints being faced by farmers in order 
for them to purchase inputs at reasonable prices (Kherallah et al, 2000; Croppenstedt et al, 
2003; Jayne et al, 2003).  
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Another misconception that is frequently being abused is the combination of a social welfare 
function with profit-maximizing behavior. Gregory (2006) argues that input subsidy vouchers 
are an income transfer to the farmer from Government, donor or any other implementing 
agency but also a transfer that can be realized through private sector participation (see also 
Kelly et al, 2003). This assumption, however, has its own problems and in this paper we 
identify two.  
Firstly, the role of Government is to raise taxes from private entities and distribute wealth to 
marginalized households or communities. Since private sector entities are profit driven and 
liable to additional taxation, the process affects the ‘laissez-faire’ assumption of the free 
operation of market forces and becomes one that continuously add transaction costs that 
become unsustainable rendering the intervention too expensive to public coffers. Government 
comes in to correct a market failure – a failure that was created by the private sector in the 
first place that profiteers a social good. Secondly, since other factors such as access to basic 
services may affect the distribution of agricultural inputs to smallholder farmers, the 
involvement of private sector participants creates rent-seeking behavior amongst private 
players as the business involved is risk-free guaranteed by Government thereby adding more 
on the transaction costs.  
As Shultz (1945) indicates, smallholder farmers in developing countries may be poor but 
efficient. It, therefore, depends on the quality and quantity of agricultural inputs being 
supplied to the targeted beneficiaries and whether they would have access to the same 
privileges that a normal commercial farmer would receive. As Kelly and Murekezi (2000) 
and Duflo et al (2008) note, application of fertilizer in maize, for example, improves the yield 
if the application is made in right quantities and using the correct methods. In other words, 
the rate of return to fertilizer application is positive but varies by region.  
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The other mistake that researchers make is to employ panel data sets which may have been 
developed using different set of conditions. Therefore, any assessment of the impact of 
fertilizer subsidy before and after an intervention is made, for example, cannot be justified by 
looking at different periods or time series but rather creating a counterfactual within the same 
period. This reduces potential selection bias by utilizing the same dataset to create a control 
group (Dehejia and Wahba, 1999; Browyn and Maffioli, 2008).  
To substantiate this argument, the targeted input program (TIP) that was implemented in 
2001 gave farmers, free of charge, 10-15 kg of fertilizer and enough hybrid seed worthy to 
plant 0.1 ha of land. Creating panel data that overflows to the period when the new 
Government in 2005/06 introduced an Agricultural Input Subsidy Program (AISP), using the 
voucher system by giving marginalized farmers 100 kg worth of fertilizer and a sizeable 
amount of seed, would distort the results culminated with measurement error as the two 
programs are totally different.  
As evidenced by Ricker-Gilbert et al (2009), one problem could be that the same respondents 
have different farm size within and between agricultural seasons. Thus, in order to avoid such 
plot-level unobserved heterogeneity, the study considers seasonal analysis in order to contain 
for any measurement errors. Recent econometric tools are available to make such an 
assessment and it is this approach that will be adopted in this paper in order to assess the 
effectiveness of public interventions targeting the poor. 
4.0 METHODOLOGY 
The problems assessed in sections 1-3 above in evaluating the impact of interventions on 
input subsidies in Malawi warrant different methodologies to be looked into. It is more 
relevant to assess the impact of an intervention based on ‘with or without’ the intervention 
scenario of the sample or population that benefited from the project. As Browyn and Maffioli 
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(2008) notes, this provides a rigorous strategy of identifying statistically robust control 
groups on non-participants. Though the ideal evaluation of an intervention necessitates the 
creation of a treatment of control group, this approach cannot be applied on human beings 
prior to the beginning of the intervention.  
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) proposed ‘propensity score matching’ (PSM) as a method that 
can be used to measure the impact of interventions on outcomes of interest. Propensity score 
matching is a method used to reduce selection bias in the estimation of treatment or 
intervention effects with observational data sets. The methodology developed is used to 
assess a counterfactual in a given set of observational data just like in any scientific 
experiment where the same sample can be used to assess the impact on the outcome if the 
treatment was not administered. Unlike interventions made on human beings, it is not likely 
that an intervention can be administered in one case and also assess the outcome on the same 
individual if the intervention was not administered, hence the need for propensity score 
matching.  
The effect of treatment evaluation on policy formulation is direct because if an intervention is 
successful it can be linked to desirable social programs or improvements in existing programs 
through reviews. The aim of adopting such a process is to enable policy makers attain the 
objectives or goals of the intervention. According to Cameron and Trivedi (2005), the 
standard problem of treatment evaluation involves the ‘inference of a causal’ connection 
between the treatment and the intended outcome. Therefore, for a given intervention, we 
observe the following:  
  NiDy iii ,...,1  ,,, x     (1) 
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In equation (1), iy  is the dependent variable or outcome of interest, ix  is a vector of 
independent variables and iD  is a binary variable indicating whether the treatment was given 
to an individual or not. The binary variable takes the following form:  






Otherwise0
occuredon interventi if1
iD    (2) 
It is the impact of a hypothetical change of iD  on ,iy  holding the vector constant ,ix  that is 
of interest. In this case, the outcome iy  is compared to the treated and non-treated states. 
Since no individual is simultaneously observed in both states we cannot use the ones who did 
not receive the treatment in the sample as a counterfactual. As such the situation becomes one 
of a ‘missing data’ state. The method of causal inference can be tackled by creating a 
counterfactual. Therefore, the question we tackle when applying PSM is to assess how the 
outcome of an average untreated individual would change if such a person did not receive the 
intervention.  
Treatment Effects Framework 
The idea of measuring the effect of a treatment or intervention requires constructing a 
measure that compares the average outcomes of the treated and non-treated groups. 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) define a propensity score as a conditional probability of 
receiving a treatment given pre-treatment characteristics. Rosenbaum and Rubin show that if 
the exposure to treatment or an intervention is random within cells defined by the vector ,ix  
it is also random within cells defined by the values of the propensity score. Therefore, given a 
population or sample of units i  the propensity score or the conditional probability of 
receiving a treatment given ix  is:  
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     xxx DEDp  1Pr     (3) 
Once propensity scores are known, we then can calculate the Average effect of Treatment on 
the Treated (ATT) as follows:  
 
   
      1,0,1         
,1         
1
01
01
01



iiiii
iii
iii
DpDyEpDyEE
pDyyEE
DyyEATT
xx
x   (4) 
In equation (4), iy1  assumes if individual receives a treatment or intervention and iy0  is a 
counterfactual if the same individual receives no treatment. This hypothesis requires two key 
assumptions namely: the conditional independence assumption and the assumption of 
unconfoundedness.  
The first assumption states that conditional on ,ix  the outcomes are independent of treatment. 
In other words, participation in the program intervention does not depend on the outcome. 
Mathematically, the representation states that the intervention outcomes are orthogonal of 
treatment conditional on the covariates given as follows:  
xDyy 10 ,      (5) 
The unconfoundedness assumption, which in some cases is referred to as the Balancing 
condition, is necessary if we are to identify some population measures of impact (Rosenbaum 
and Rubin, 1983; Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). Given the overlap or matching assumption in 
equation (3), the assumption in equation (5) ensures that for each value of the vector ,ix  
there exist both treated and non-treated cases. The propensity score measure can be computed 
given the data  iiD x, through either a probit or logit regression. The selection of variables 
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within the vector ,ix  may be based on policy intervention selection criteria. For instance, an 
intervention targeting a certain population may be defined based on observable human 
characteristics (age, gender, socioeconomic status, etc.). Thus, for the unconfoundedness 
assumption, it states that given the propensity score:  
 xx pD       (6) 
Equation (6) states that for individuals with the same propensity score, the assignment of an 
intervention is orthogonal or random. Thus, with the balancing condition, the conditional 
independence assumption given x  implies conditional independence given   :xp  
 xx pDyyDyy  1010 ,,    (7) 
Based on the above set of assumptions, the PSM technique employs predicted probability of 
group membership – that is, treatment versus non-treatment group – based on observed 
predictors usually obtained from a probit or logistic regression to create a counterfactual 
group.  
Matching using Propensity Scores 
Using calculated propensity scores as defined in equation (3) is not enough to estimate 
average treatment effects of an intervention (Dehejia and Wahba, 1999; Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2005; Becker and Ichino, 2009). The reason is that the propensity score is usually a 
continuous variable and the probability of observing two units with exactly the same 
propensity score is in principle not possible. A number of methodologies have been proposed 
in the literature with the aim of overcoming this problem (see Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). In 
this evaluation exercise, however, we will consider only four most common methods widely 
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used: nearest neighbor matching, radius matching, kernel matching and stratification or 
interval matching
3
.  
Methods and Application 
Thus far, we have outlined one of the effective ways of assessing any program interventions 
made either by Government, donors, or implementing agencies on a desired outcome or goal. 
Policy makers ought to know whether their interventions have been successful or not before 
formulating another intervention. Employing treatment evaluation techniques provides such 
leverage.  
In this study, we employ treatment evaluation methods to assess the impact of input subsidy 
programs in Malawi. We use random data collected by the National Statistical Office (NSO) 
to assess the impact of two interventions: the Targeted Input Program (TIP) that ended in 
2004/05 fiscal year and the Agricultural Input Subsidy Program (AISP) that commenced 
immediately after in 2005/06 fiscal year. The data was collected in 2006/07 fiscal year by the 
NSO through a special survey called the Agricultural Input Subsidy Survey (AISS). The TIP 
will be assessed using the Integrated Household Survey 2004/05 (IHS2).  
Model Specification 
The Malawi Government in fiscal year 2005/06 introduced the AISP, following a poor 
harvest in fiscal year 2004/05. The AISP increased the quantity of fertilizer given to 
smallholder farmers to 100 kg of basal and top dressing fertilizer worth of cultivating an acre 
of farm land and 10 kg of hybrid seed to plant on the same farm size. The TIP program 
offered 10-15 kg of fertilizer and about 1 kg of hybrid seed worth of cultivating 0.1 hectares 
                                                          
3
 Details on how these matching estimators are calculated can be found in Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, p.871-
879 
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of farm land. The AISP in 2005/06 extended input subsidies to tobacco smallholder farmers 
but was later dropped in the 2006/07 planting period.  
The main objective of the input subsidy programs before and after 2004/05 was to increase 
agricultural productivity and food security. In particular, the program aimed at improving 
land and labor productivity and production of both food and cash crops by smallholder 
farmers that faced heavy cash constraints restraining them from purchasing the necessary 
inputs (Dorward et al, 2008). The overall goal of the program was to promote economic 
growth and reduce vulnerability to food insecurity, hunger and poverty. The AISP was 
implemented through the distribution of fertilizer vouchers of which the beneficiary had to 
contribute MK950 per voucher of fertilizer and exchange a voucher of seed free of charge. In 
later years, the contribution made by beneficiaries reduced to MK500 in 2009/10 fiscal year. 
In comparison to the TIP program, targeted smallholder farmers were given all inputs free of 
charge but in small quantities.  
To assess the impact of such interventions in the given seasons or fiscal years, we will 
employ an empirical model on food security. The model adopts Sadoulet and De Janvry 
(1995) household model with less efficient markets where the household problem is to solve 
simultaneously allocation of resources between production, consumption and work decisions 
given household characteristics. In its structural form, the household problem is to maximize 
utility  u  with respect to consumption and work decisions subject to a given production 
function  g  and household characteristics:  
 
 ha
h
lma
ccclxq
lxqgts
cccu
lmaa
z
z
,,,      ..           
;,,max
,,,,,

   (8a)
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In equation (8a), utility is maximized given consumption goods (agricultural goods ac  and 
manufactured goods mc ), home time lc  and household characteristics 
hz  subject to a 
household production function aq   and a set of fixed and variable inputs  lx, . The empirical 
model assumes a linear function and in a reduced form format:  
 LSWCEHPG ,,,,,,,ii yy     (8b) 
In equation (8b), iy  is the outcome of interest – kilocalorie consumption per household; G  is 
a vector of government interventions (starter pack program or TIP of 2004/05, agriculture 
extension services, Agricultural Input Subsidy Program of 2006/07); P  is a vector of prices 
(tobacco auction price, maize grain price, maize flour price, fertilizer, casual labor – supply 
and demand prices, charcoal, transport, and price index of other consumables); H  is a vector 
of household characteristics (age, gender, education, health status, sources of lighting and 
cooking, farm size, livestock assets, access to portable water, wellbeing); E  is a vector of 
economic variables (market access, distance to market, area of residence, access to road 
surface); C  is a vector of community characteristics (belonging to an 
association/cooperative, access to agricultural credit, irrigation scheme, access to small and 
large markets): W  is a vector of weather conditions (availability of rain); S  is a vector of 
seasonal effects (lean period, dry period, harvest period, year of interview); and L  is a vector 
of location effects (agricultural division).  
Data Management  
The study utilizes raw household data from the 2004/05 second Integrated Household Survey 
(IHS2) and the 2006/07 Agricultural Input Subsidy Survey (AISS). The AISS is a follow-up 
panel data survey of households interviewed during the IHS2 survey. The variables within 
each vector of interest of the household model in equation (8a) and (8b) are calculated and 
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averaged over districts. The prices calculated are district averages from both household and 
community databases. A number of robustness checks are conducted which include 
controlling for outliers, management of duplicate records and conducting principal 
component analysis to create a livestock index.  
The two datasets created are used to estimate a parsimonious specification of the household 
model in order to assess the basic determinants of household expenditure on food. Our 
variable of interest in the two models to be estimated is on the impact of the input subsidy 
programs on household food expenditure. We will investigate whether access to input 
subsidies at varying quantities were effective in increasing household food consumption.  
The next section outlines diagnostic checks for omitted variables, functional form, 
heteroskedasticity and collinearity. After correcting for these checks, we estimate the 
household model using complex survey design techniques. Average Treatment Effects on the 
Treated (ATT) are also calculated to determine the effectiveness of the two input subsidies 
through the use of propensity scores. The calculation of propensity scores to assess the ‘with 
and without’ intervention on the input subsidy beneficiaries are based on the input subsidy 
beneficiary selection criteria: gender, household age and whether the householder is 
considered poor or not. The preferred software for our analysis will be done using STATA.  
The study presents ATT results based on four common matching mechanisms: nearest 
neighbor, kernel, stratification and radius matching techniques. We will utilize algorithms 
developed by Becker and Ichino (2009) that calculates ATT based on these matching 
methods. The results enable us to present a range of intervention effects of input subsidies on 
household food expenditures. Usually the variable of interest (or hypothesis test) is expected 
to contribute positively to food consumption as it is aimed at adding more to the food 
consumption basket.  
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Robustness Checks 
The following table presents robustness checks on the data for the two models to be 
estimated.  
Table 2: Robustness Checks on Survey Data 
Robustness Checks Null Hypothesis Statistic Model 1: Model 2: Conclusion 
Ramsey RESET test 
using powers of the 
fitted values of 
dependent variable 
Model has no omitted 
variables 
F-statistic 184.54 40.1 Reject null hypothesis. 
However dataset has limited 
observations 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 
Functional Form and 
Heteroskedasticity 
using Cameron and 
Trivedi 
decomposition of IM-
test 
Heteroskedasticity p-value 0.0000 0.0000 
Reject but not for kurtosis. For 
skewness transform dependent 
variable to log form Skewness p-value 0.0000 0.0000 
Kurtosis p-value 1.0000 1.0000 
Breusch-
Pagan/Cook-
Welsberg test for 
heteroskedasticity 
constant variance 
chi2 10550.27 2040.06 Reject & report Huber/White 
heteroskedastic-consistent 
standard errors: weighted least 
squares 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 
Test for 
Multicollinearity 
using Variance 
Inflation Factors 
No Multicollinearity mean VIF 20.16 5.44 
Drop some variables in both 
models and form principal 
components 
Design Effect 
  
SVYSET SVYSET Use Complex Survey Design 
We first check whether the models have no omitted variables. We use the Ramsey RESET 
test using powers of the fitted values of the food expenditure dependent variable. The results 
show that the two models are affected by omitted variables. Since the two datasets are limited 
on the number of variables that can be created we still estimate the models given the present 
variables.  
On functional form and heteroskedasticity, we use Cameron and Trivedi decomposition of 
the IM test that tests for heteroskedasticity, skewness and kurtosis. The results for both 
models suggest that there are problems of heteroskedasticity and skewness. We will 
therefore, use weighted least squares and a log-linearised model to correct for skewness.  
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The Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Welsberg test is used to test for overall heteroskedasticity in the 
two models and results show that both models are affected by heteroskedasticity. This further 
substantiates the need to report Huber/White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.  
Finally, we test for multicollinearity on the variables of interest using variance inflation 
factors (VIF). In both models there is evidence of multicollinearity and such variables are 
dropped. One common variable in both equations is the square of household age.    
Data Description – Complex Survey Design 
The first data collected under the IHS2 used complex survey design methodologies. The first 
stage involved creating primary sampling units (PSU) using 564 Enumeration Areas (EA). 
Each EA was randomly selected from each strata (district) on the basis of probability 
proportional to size. Twenty (20) households were randomly selected from each PSU based 
on household population. The IHS2 database is a panel dataset that covered two growing 
seasons in Malawi. Some information collected in 2004 was based on crop production and 
input use from the 2002/03 production season and the data collected in 2005 was based on 
crop production and input use during the 2003/04 production season.  
A follow-up survey was conducted in May/June 2007 re-interviewing 3,298 households in 
175 EAs. Out of this sample, 2,874 households were previously interviewed in the IHS2 
survey. This dataset will be referred in this study as the AISS. The survey design process was 
the same as the one adopted under IHS2. After controlling for duplicate records, the AISS 
sample size was reduced to 2,937 households of which 1,205 households reported to have 
benefited from the input subsidy. Based on this response, 57% reported receiving both 100kg 
basal and top dressing fertilizer through the Government Agricultural Input Subsidy Program 
(AISP). The analysis of the impact of the AISP will therefore be based on respondents who 
received 100kg of fertilizer based on the goal of the AISP.  
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The 2006/07 AISS database has a lot of missing values which constrains the analysis to only 
those variables that can be used to estimate the household model. In order to complement 
some of the missing variables, the study uses 2004/05 IHS2 estimates on some key variables 
such as food consumption expenditure. The 2004/05 food expenditure data is projected using 
real GDP growth rates commencing 2003/04 production season to 2006/07 production 
season. In addition, some of the basic services will be assumed to have remained constant in 
2006/07 as they were before in 2004/05. Such variables include community based variables 
such as access to safe water, electricity, distance to and availability of markets in the 
community, among others. 
5.0 MODEL ESTIMATION AND RESULTS  
The results for the estimated models are given in tables 6 and 7 (see annex II) together with 
the estimated ATT for the input subsidy intervention based on Becker and Ichino (2009) 
algorithms. Table 8 and 9 (see annex III) present detailed ATT estimation using matching 
mechanisms and shows the number of treated and control groups for each methodology 
adopted. The estimated numbers of blocks and propensity score estimation results are given 
in tables 10 and 11 (annex IV) based on the common support approach. After controlling for 
complex survey design, the results after estimating a log-linear function with food 
expenditure as the dependent variable show that the Starter Pack (TIP) program had a 
significant negative impact of approximately 0.07 (7%) or reduced food expenditures by 
MK1,097.00 (1,097 Malawi Kwacha).  
Overall the results obtained after controlling for treatment effects (nearest neighbor, 
stratification, radius and kernel matching) taken together, also give evidence of a significant 
negative ATT in the range of MK403-MK2922 associated with the TIP subsidy when 
evaluated with non-experimental or without intervention comparison groups. Note that the 
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ATT results are close to the coefficient estimate for the TIP impact given in our household 
model of MK1, 097
4
. The results also concur with evaluations made by government and some 
researchers on the TIP subsidy as not being effective in reducing poverty and food insecurity 
(Dorward et al 2008; Ricker-Gilbert et al 2009).  
The second model assumes the same structure of the household model given in equations (8a) 
and (8b). Due to incoherent and inconsistent variables tracked in the 2006/07 follow-up 
survey, some of the vectors in the second model have reduced the number of variables than in 
the first model on TIP subsidy. Some common variables such as access to markets within 
communities, access to roads, main source of lighting and cooking are assumed to be constant 
in 2006/07 as they were during the 2004/05 IHS2 survey. The dependent variable on food 
expenditures is projected based on real GDP growth rates experienced since 2003/04 to 
2006/07 fiscal years. The impact of the AISP will thus be assessed on whether it was 
effective in positively contributing to increased food expenditures in 2006/07 production 
year.  
The survey design process of the 2006/07 AISS followed a complex survey design and we 
will use the same modeling as in the first model. Table 7 reports the results and the test 
statistics. Though the results show insignificant results on the effectiveness of the AISP in 
improving food security, the sign of the coefficients are positive indicating that the new 
approach adopted by Government in 2005/06 and continued during the 2006/07 positively 
contributed to reducing food insecurity by increasing household food consumption.  
The second household model results show that those who benefited from the full subsidy of 
the AISP, though insignificant, had a positive contribution of MK148 towards food 
                                                          
4
 Note that the coefficient estimates in log-terms given in table 1 and 2 are transformed using the exponential 
function.  
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expenditure than those who did not benefit from the AISP. Overall, the results obtained after 
controlling for ATT also give evidence that for those who received a full subsidy from 
Government had a positive impact in the range of MK74 to MK8,955 associated with the 
2006/07 AISP when evaluated without the intervention comparison group. However, the 
results presented may be subjected to misspecification errors due to lack of data and appear to 
be sensitive if some of the variables are included (e.g., TIP in 2004 or total income in 
2006/07). One of the key contributing factors could be the period of the evaluation which was 
too short (May-July 2007) and a lot of missing values in the dataset.  
The study also evaluated the impact of market access on household food expenditures. Four 
key variables were included in each household model that looked at market access and the 
effect of distance to the market. The study results show that those who had access to large 
markets or small markets in their communities in both production years negatively impacted 
on household food expenditures.  
6.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The paper has demonstrated on how we can use treatment effects to evaluate the impact of 
public interventions based on independent datasets. The study has also employed new 
algorithms developed by Becker and Ichino (2009) to assess input subsidy effects on 
household food expenditures. The main conclusions from this study can be summarized as 
follows: the impact of the input subsidy programs in Malawi becomes stronger as policy 
makers improve on the quantities of inputs subsidized. There is clear significant evidence of 
the negative impact of the Starter Pack (TIP) program and some significant evidence on the 
impact of the AISP on household food security when we use treatment effects at the ten 
percent significance level. The latter could be a result of the short window given to evaluate 
the AISP and the numerous missing values of the tracked variables. However, it is expected 
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that future surveys as organized by the IHS2 may provide positive significant evidence on the 
effectiveness of input subsidies on household food expenditures.  
We have also found that access to basic services in rural areas such as markets negatively 
impact on the availability of household food security. We conclude that interventions geared 
towards complementing input subsidies should be supported with interventions aimed at 
improving basic services such as the development of markets in rural areas. In concluding, 
we offer a few recommendations based on the results obtained in this study when assessing 
the impact of input subsidies in Malawi or any other program intervention aimed at 
improving national economic growth and poverty reduction. Some of the recommendations 
are based on weaknesses envisaged when evaluating the two NSO survey datasets in this 
study.  
Finally, in order to effectively, efficiently, independently and successfully evaluate public 
interventions the following recommendations should be adopted by program implementers 
and collectors of national statistical data:  
i) A detailed assessment of the project rationale of a given public intervention policy should 
be effectively analyzed that includes a description of possible market failures that the 
intervention could face and would be addressing in the course of implementing the 
project including the targeted groups expected to address the problem.  
ii) A description of short, medium and long term expected outcomes that the intervention 
aims to address should be provided so that specific surveys can be developed and 
conducted for each stage of project benefits. To evaluate the impact of a given program, it 
is the long-term goal that is of interest and key indicators should be developed based on 
the expected outcomes.  
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iii) Relevant tracking mechanisms should be adopted to collect primary data on key variables 
that would be affected by the intervention in question. In most cases a household model 
would be the best starting point of determining the type of information to be tracked and 
how that dependent variable will be affected by the intervention in question.  
iv) In order to assess the impact of public interventions effectively and independently it is 
important that implementers of such programs should link up with the National Statistical 
Office personnel in country in order to formulate the type of questions to be tracked as 
they may provide a ‘low cost’ independent platform of collecting the same information by 
simply including specific ‘program intervention’ sections on existing questionnaires that 
they randomly collect.  
v) Follow-up surveys conducted by the National Statistical Office should promote the 
continuance collection of original questionnaire variables collected in the Integrated 
Household Survey in order to be able to evaluate the impact of a specific intervention 
based on the household model. This observation is based on the different sets of variables 
that were collected in the 2006/07 follow-up survey on assessing the impact of 
agricultural input subsidies in Malawi that were different from the original IHS2 survey.  
vi) Project implementers should also defer from conducting project evaluations on their own 
and should allocate project costs on evaluation towards assisting data collection by the 
National Statistical Office. The National Statistical Office has different forms of surveys 
that are tracked annually including the Welfare Monitoring Surveys (WMS). Project 
implementers can utilize these datasets as a platform of collecting their annual data 
independently. The NSO would then be responsible for coordinating the annual flow of 
funds from these projects towards their independent data collection.  
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8.0 ANNEXES 
Annex I: Data Description and Sources 
Table 3: Data Description from IHS2 Cleaned data.dta 
IHS2 Household Level Key Variables 
 Observations: 11280 
 Date of Analysis: 2/14/2010 18:59 
 Variable Name Variable Label Binary 
TIP Householder Received a Starter Pack (TIP) as safety net from Government  yes 
agext Field Assistant resides in Community yes 
agextcp Householder receives advice from field assistant on general crop production yes 
agextsv Householder receives advice from field assistant on new seed varieties yes 
agextfu Householder receives advice from field assistant on fertilizer use yes 
agextirri Householder receives advice from field assistant on irrigation yes 
agextac Householder receives advice from field assistant on general animal care yes 
agextmkt Householder receives advice from field assistant on marketing/crop sales yes 
agextcre Householder receives advice from field assistant on access to credit yes 
p_tobauction Average price of tobacco in district at auction floors MK/kg   
p_maize Average price of maize in district MK/kg   
p_fert Average price of fertilizer in district MK/kg   
p_ganyu Average hire  price of casual/ganyu labor in district MK/day   
p_index Average price index of miscellaneous consumables   
p_char Average price of charcoal in district   
p_ker Average price of kerosene in district   
p_tpt Average price of transport in district   
p_mflour Average price of maize flour in district MK/kg   
p_dwage Average price of casual/ganyu labor in district MK/day   
hhage Age of Household Head   
fadult HH: Females 15-64 years of age   
madult HH: Males 15-64 years of age   
mlgtp Householder uses paraffin for lighting fuel yes 
mlgte Householder uses electricity for lighting yes 
mcooke Householder uses electricity for cooking yes 
mcookf Householder uses firewood for cooking yes 
mcookc Householder uses charcoal for cooking yes 
nonlabor Non-labor income (MK per year)   
fhh Householder is female (0/1) yes 
yrsed years of education   
inter Interaction term between female householder and years of education   
elderly H: Individuals 65+ years of age   
illness Householder or wife had a serious illness that prevented participation in activities yes 
farmszpc Total land holding per person   
l_index Livestock index based on principal components analysis   
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IHS2 Household Level Key Variables 
 Observations: 11280 
 Date of Analysis: 2/14/2010 18:59 
 Variable Name Variable Label Binary 
water Householder has access to personal water supply yes 
wbeing Householder considers wellbeing in year improved 0/1 yes 
distmkt distance (km) to nearest daily market   
reside Urban/Rural dummy yes 
roadbin1 road==Tar/Asphalt Graded yes 
agcredit Existence of Farmers credit clubs in community yes 
coop Existence of Farmers cooperatives in community yes 
irriscm Irrigation scheme in community yes 
mktsmall Access to a Daily Market in community yes 
mktlarge Access to a Larger Market in community yes 
rain_l For growing maize, the amount of rain was too little yes 
rain_m For growing maize, the amount of rain was too much yes 
season1 Interview took place in the months of Dec, Jan, Feb (planting period) yes 
season2 Interview took place in the months of March, April, May (lean period) yes 
season4 Interview took place in the months of Sept, Oct, Nov (dry period) yes 
year2004 Interview took place in 2004 yes 
psu Primary Sampling Unit or Enumeration Area (564 total)   
hhwght IHS2 Household weight   
hhsize HH Size based on household members    
strata Stratum: district & urban/rural (30 total)   
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Table 4: Data Description from AISSfinal.dta 
IHS2 Household Level Key Variables 
 Observations 2937 
 Date of Analysis: 2/17/2010  20:12:00 PM 
 Variable Name Variable Label Binary 
aissf Householder received both basal and top dressing subsidy fertilizer yes 
agextsv Householder received advice from FA on seed varieties yes 
agextfu Householder received advice from FA on fertilizer use yes 
p_lmaize Average price of local maize in district MK/kg   
p_hmaize Average price of hybrid maize in district MK/kg   
p_tobacco Average price of burley tobacco in district MK/kg   
p_wage Average wage of casual/ganyu labor in district MK/day   
hhage Age of Householder   
fhh Householder is female 0/1 yes 
consyr Householder considers food consumption inadequate yes 
l_index Livestock index based on principal component analysis   
water Householder has access to personal water supply yes 
madult HH: Males 15-64 years of age   
fadult HH: Females 15-64 years of age   
elderly HH: Individuals 65+ years of age   
mlgtp Householder uses paraffin for lighting fuel yes 
mlgte Householder uses electricity for lighting yes 
mcooke Householder uses electricity for cooking yes 
mcookf Householder uses firewood for cooking yes 
mcookc Householder uses charcoal for cooking yes 
distmkt distance (km) to nearest daily market   
mktsmall Access to a Daily Market in community yes 
mktlarge Access to a Larger Market in community yes 
roadbin1 road==Tar/Asphalt Graded yes 
roadbin3 road==Dirt Road (maintained) yes 
roadbin4  road==Dirt track yes 
ADMARC Access to permanent ADMARC market in community yes 
farmszpc Total land holding per person   
wbeing Householder considers welfare has deteriorated yes 
poor Householder considers status in 2006/07 poor yes 
coop Existence of Farmers cooperatives in community yes 
irriscm Irrigation scheme in community yes 
ICT Householder has access to cellphone yes 
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Key Variables Used 
Model 1 
     Variable Observations Mean  Std. Dev. Min. Max 
TIP 11280     0.00 1.00 
kcalpc 11280 14172.63 13107.24 1076.74 260675.00 
lkcalpc 11280 9.31 0.67 6.98 12.47 
p_tobauction 9360 67.15 4.58 56.98 80.57 
p_maize 11280 14.75 2.99 9.49 22.63 
p_fert 11280 48.95 3.48 36.00 56.13 
p_ganyu 11040 55.10 2.69 50.00 65.00 
p_index 11280 74.02 3.29 64.34 80.40 
p_char 11280 142.20 19.28 100.00 200.00 
p_ker 11280 19.64 2.73 16.00 28.56 
p_tpt 11280 238.25 18.46 204.00 274.29 
p_mflour 11280 18.13 0.76 15.70 19.84 
p_dwage 11280 59.65 3.82 53.69 69.71 
hhage 11280 42.46 16.35 14.00 103.00 
nonlabor 11276 488.65 6787.11 0.00 350000.00 
yrsed 11240 4.85 4.22 0.00 19.00 
farmszpc 11039 0.26 0.32 0.00 5.10 
l_index 11272 0.00 1.20 -0.20 30.11 
distmkt 11260 7.08 10.33 0.00 76.00 
hhsize 11280 4.55 2.34 1.00 27.00 
propensity score 10999 0.54 0.12 0.33 0.88 
      Model 2: 
     Variable Observations Mean  Std. Dev. Min. Max 
aissf 1205     0.00 1.00 
kcalpc07 2937 15377.18 12536.48 1584.34 200790.00 
lkcalpc07 2937 9.43 0.63 7.37 12.21 
p_lmaize 2937 11.25 2.57 5.71 18.00 
p_hmaize 2937 10.28 1.32 8.27 13.67 
p_tobacco 2937 142.76 14.86 116.25 179.43 
p_wage 2937 175.69 18.72 143.09 214.18 
hhage 2923 47.01 16.89 0.00 99.00 
l_index 2868 -0.04 1.56 -1.37 46.07 
distmkt 2937 7.83 9.77 0.00 55.00 
farmszpc 2866 0.30 0.33 0.00 5.10 
propensity score 1171 0.57 0.08 0.34 0.67 
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Annex II: OLS Estimates of Household Model (Dependent Variable: 
Kilocalorie Food Expenditure per Capita)  
Table 6: Regression Results on Model 1 with Average Treatment Effects on the Treated 
  SVYSET5   ATTND   ATTR   ATTK   ATTS   
Model 1 lkcalpc kcalpc lkcalpc kcalpc lkcalpc kcalpc lkcalpc kcalpc lkcalpc kcalpc 
TIP -0.07 -1097 -0.069 -992 -0.074 -1636 -0.060 -403 -0.202 -2922 
  (0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)***   0.00)***    (0.00)***   
agext -0.10   0.31   0.31   0.31       
  (0.00)**   (0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)***       
agextcp -0.09   0.31   0.31   0.31       
  (0.21)   (0.16)   (0.16)   (0.16)       
agextsv 0.05   0.12   0.12   0.12       
  (0.36)   (0.57)   (0.57)   (0.57)       
agextfu 0.03   0.18   0.18   0.18       
  (0.68)   (0.40)   (0.40)   (0.40)       
agextirri -0.02   0.47   0.47   0.47       
  (0.66)   (0.01)**   (0.01)**   (0.01)**       
agextac 0.04   -0.12   -0.12   -0.12       
  (0.37)   (0.50)   (0.50)   (0.50)       
agextmkt -0.03   -0.11   -0.11   -0.11       
  (0.47)   (0.52)   (0.52)   (0.52)       
agextcre 0.02   -0.06   -0.06   -0.06       
  (0.59)   (0.73)   (0.73)   (0.73)       
p_tobauction 0.00   0.01   0.01   0.01       
  (0.43)   (0.33)   (0.33)   (0.33)       
p_maize -0.00   0.08   0.08   0.08       
  (0.61)   (0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)***       
p_fert 0.01   -0.01   -0.01   -0.01       
  (0.01)*   (0.32)   (0.32)   (0.32)       
p_ganyu -0.00   -0.10   -0.10   -0.10       
  (0.94)   (0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)***       
p_index -0.00   -0.04   -0.04   -0.04       
  (0.80)   (0.06)   (0.06)   (0.06)       
p_char 0.00   -0.00   -0.00   -0.00       
  (0.00)***   (0.30)   (0.30)   (0.30)       
p_ker -0.00   0.07   0.07   0.07       
  (0.85)   (0.03)*   (0.03)*   (0.03)*       
p_tpt 0.00   -0.02   -0.02   -0.02       
  (0.10)   (0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)***       
                                                          
5
 Second column presents results on base OLS model using complex survey design. Columns 3-6 presents 
Average Treatment Effects on the Treated (ATT) using propensity scores – 3
rd
 column: ATT ( Nearest Neighbor 
matching); 4
th
 Column: ATT (Radius matching); 5
th
 Column: ATT (Kernel matching); 6
th
 Column: ATT 
(Stratification matching) 
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  SVYSET5   ATTND   ATTR   ATTK   ATTS   
Model 1 lkcalpc kcalpc lkcalpc kcalpc lkcalpc kcalpc lkcalpc kcalpc lkcalpc kcalpc 
p_mflour -0.00   0.16   0.16   0.16       
  (0.95)   (0.02)*   (0.02)*   (0.02)*       
p_dwage 0.00   0.03   0.03   0.03       
  (0.98)   (0.02)*   (0.02)*   (0.02)*       
hhage 0.00   0.02   0.02   0.02       
  (0.75)   (0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)***       
fadult -0.20   0.24   0.24   0.24       
  (0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)***       
madult -0.08   0.13   0.13   0.13       
  (0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)***       
mlgtp 0.07   0.23   0.23   0.23       
  (0.01)**   (0.01)**   (0.01)**   (0.01)**       
mlgte 0.34   -1.28   -1.28   -1.28       
  (0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)***       
mcooke 0.53   0.01   0.01   0.01       
  (0.00)***   (0.98)   (0.98)   (0.98)       
mcookf -0.02   0.09   0.09   0.09       
  (0.78)   (0.68)   (0.68)   (0.68)       
mcookc 0.35   -0.72   -0.72   -0.72       
  (0.00)***   (0.01)*   (0.01)*   (0.01)*       
nonlabor 0.00   -0.00   -0.00   -0.00       
  (0.19)   (0.04)*   (0.04)*   (0.04)*       
fhh 0.02   0.17   0.17   0.17       
  (0.43)   (0.04)*   (0.04)*   (0.04)*       
yrsed 0.03   -0.04   -0.04   -0.04       
  (0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)***       
inter 0.01   -0.01   -0.01   -0.01       
  (0.00)**   (0.48)   (0.48)   (0.48)       
elderly -0.09   0.23   0.23   0.23       
  (0.00)***   (0.00)**   (0.00)**   (0.00)**       
illness 0.05   0.12   0.12   0.12       
  (0.00)***   (0.02)*   (0.02)*   (0.02)*       
farmszpc 0.47   0.39   0.39   0.39       
  (0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)***       
l_index 0.01   -0.06   -0.06   -0.06       
  (0.01)**   (0.00)**   (0.00)**   (0.00)**       
water 0.14   -0.36   -0.36   -0.36       
  (0.00)***   (0.00)**   (0.00)**   (0.00)**       
wbeing 0.16   0.04   0.04   0.04       
  (0.00)***   (0.47)   (0.47)   (0.47)       
distmkt -0.00   0.01   0.01   0.01       
  (0.09)   (0.02)*   (0.02)*   (0.02)*       
reside -0.08   1.15   1.15   1.15       
  (0.15)   (0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)***       
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  SVYSET5   ATTND   ATTR   ATTK   ATTS   
Model 1 lkcalpc kcalpc lkcalpc kcalpc lkcalpc kcalpc lkcalpc kcalpc lkcalpc kcalpc 
roadbin1 0.02   -0.06   -0.06   -0.06       
  (0.59)   (0.52)   (0.52)   (0.52)       
agcredit 0.13   -0.22   -0.22   -0.22       
  (0.00)***   (0.01)*   (0.01)*   (0.01)*       
coop -0.03   0.17   0.17   0.17       
  (0.43)   (0.13)   (0.13)   (0.13)       
irriscm -0.13   -0.18   -0.18   -0.18       
  (0.01)**   (0.15)   (0.15)   (0.15)       
mktsmall -0.03   -0.08   -0.08   -0.08       
  (0.21)   (0.28)   (0.28)   (0.28)       
mktlarge -0.18   0.47   0.47   0.47       
  (0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)***       
rain_l -0.04   0.25   0.25   0.25       
  (0.21)   (0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)***       
rain_m 0.03   0.09   0.09   0.09       
  (0.41)   (0.20)   (0.20)   (0.20)       
season1 -0.17   -0.08   -0.08   -0.08       
  (0.00)***   (0.36)   (0.36)   (0.36)       
season2 -0.02   0.06   0.06   0.06       
  (0.60)   (0.34)   (0.34)   (0.34)       
season4 -0.17   -0.14   -0.14   -0.14       
  (0.00)***   (0.04)*   (0.04)*   (0.04)*       
year2004 0.16   0.09   0.09   0.09       
  (0.00)***   (0.21)   (0.21)   (0.21)       
N 8835 N 8835   8835   8835   10999   
R-sq 0.337 pseudo R-sq 0.141   0.141   0.141       
Marginal Effects; p-values in parenthesis 
       (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
       ="* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001" 
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Table 7: Regression Results on Model 2 with Average Treatment Effects on the Treated
6
  
  SVYSET   ATTND   ATTR   ATTK   ATTS   
Model 2 lkcalpc kcalpc lkcalpc kcalpc lkcalpc kcalpc lkcalpc kcalpc lkcalpc kcalpc 
aissf 0.05 148 0.091 8955 0.043 74 0.052 181 0.059 365 
 
(0.21)   (1.637)^   (0.261)   (1.509)^   (1.832)^   
agextsv -0.08   0.62   0.62   0.62       
 
(0.52)   (0.22)   (0.22)   (0.22)       
agextfu 0.19   -0.64   -0.64   -0.64       
 
(0.15)   (0.20)   (0.20)   (0.20)       
p_lmaize 0.00   0.07   0.07   0.07       
 
(0.76)   (0.03)*   (0.03)*   (0.03)*       
p_hmaize 0.03   -0.10   -0.10   -0.10       
 
(0.31)   (0.10)   (0.10)   (0.10)       
p_tobacco 0.00   -0.02   -0.02   -0.02       
 
(0.26)   (0.02)*   (0.02)*   (0.02)*       
p_wage 0.00   0.01   0.01   0.01       
 
(0.85)   (0.00)**   (0.00)**   (0.00)**       
hhage 0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00       
 
(0.39)   (0.61)   (0.61)   (0.61)       
fhh 0.02   -0.38   -0.38   -0.38       
 
(0.59)   (0.02)*   (0.02)*   (0.02)*       
consyr 0.00   -0.24   -0.24   -0.24       
 
(0.96)   (0.09)   (0.09)   (0.09)       
l_index 0.03   0.17   0.17   0.17       
 
(0.09)   (0.02)*   (0.02)*   (0.02)*       
water 0.06   0.11   0.11   0.11       
 
(0.60)   (0.72)   (0.72)   (0.72)       
madult -0.08   0.20   0.20   0.20       
 
(0.00)***   (0.01)*   (0.01)*   (0.01)*       
fadult -0.17   0.23   0.23   0.23       
 
(0.00)***   (0.02)*   (0.02)*   (0.02)*       
elderly -0.10   0.11   0.11   0.11       
 
(0.02)*   (0.50)   (0.50)   (0.50)       
mlgtp 0.20   0.32   0.32   0.32       
 
(0.00)**   (0.19)   (0.19)   (0.19)       
mlgte 0.80 
 
0.85 
 
0.85 
 
0.85 
   
 
(0.00)*** 
 
(0.39) 
 
(0.39) 
 
(0.39) 
   mcooke -0.01 
 
-1.23 
 
-1.23 
 
-1.23 
   
 
(0.98) 
 
(0.37) 
 
(0.37) 
 
(0.37) 
   mcookf -0.19 
 
-0.24 
 
-0.24 
 
-0.24 
   
 
(0.29) 
 
(0.72) 
 
(0.72) 
 
(0.72) 
   mcookc 0.04 
         
 
(0.85) 
         distmkt -0.00 
 
-0.00 
 
-0.00 
 
-0.00 
                                                             
6
 Note that those in parenthesis for ATT are t-statistics.  
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  SVYSET   ATTND   ATTR   ATTK   ATTS   
Model 2 lkcalpc kcalpc lkcalpc kcalpc lkcalpc kcalpc lkcalpc kcalpc lkcalpc kcalpc 
 
(0.15) 
 
(0.70) 
 
(0.70) 
 
(0.70) 
   mktsmall 0.01 
 
0.01 
 
0.01 
 
0.01 
   
 
(0.85) 
 
(0.94) 
 
(0.94) 
 
(0.94) 
   mktlarge -0.16 
 
0.24 
 
0.24 
 
0.24 
   
 
(0.04)* 
 
(0.21) 
 
(0.21) 
 
(0.21) 
   roadbin1 0.07 
 
-0.37 
 
-0.37 
 
-0.37 
   
 
(0.59) 
 
(0.26) 
 
(0.26) 
 
(0.26) 
   roadbin3 -0.20 
 
-0.54 
 
-0.54 
 
-0.54 
   
 
(0.01)** 
 
(0.03)* 
 
(0.03)* 
 
(0.03)* 
   roadbin4 -0.14   0.20 
 
0.20 
 
0.20 
   
 
(0.15)   (0.48) 
 
(0.48) 
 
(0.48) 
   ADMARC 0.03 
 
-0.20 
 
-0.20 
 
-0.20 
   
 
(0.73) 
 
(0.34) 
 
(0.34) 
 
(0.34) 
   farmszpc 0.54 
 
0.14 
 
0.14 
 
0.14 
   
 
(0.00)*** 
 
(0.55) 
 
(0.55) 
 
(0.55) 
   wbeing -0.11 
 
-0.17 
 
-0.17 
 
-0.17 
   
 
(0.01)** 
 
(0.32) 
 
(0.32) 
 
(0.32) 
   poor -0.08 
 
-0.56 
 
-0.56 
 
-0.56 
   
 
(0.08) 
 
(0.00)*** 
 
(0.00)*** 
 
(0.00)*** 
   coop -0.01 
 
0.53 
 
0.53 
 
0.53 
   
 
(0.91) 
 
(0.00)** 
 
(0.00)** 
 
(0.00)** 
   irriscm -0.19 
 
-0.37 
 
-0.37 
 
-0.37 
   
 
(0.03)* 
 
(0.05) 
 
(0.05) 
 
(0.05) 
   ICT -0.14 
 
-0.79 
 
-0.79 
 
-0.79 
   
 
(0.32) 
 
(0.44) 
 
(0.44) 
 
(0.44) 
   N 1147 N 1143 
 
1143 
 
1143 
 
1176 
 R-sq 0.233 pR-sq 0.066 
 
0.066 
 
0.066 
   
           Marginal Effects; p-values in parenthesis 
       (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
      ="* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001" ^p<0.10 
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Annex III: Number of Treated and Control Groups using ATT 
Table 8: Bootstrapped Standard Errors for Model 1 based on IHS2 Dataset 
ATTND 
    ATT estimation with Nearest Neighbor Matching method (random draw version) 
Bootstrapped Standard Errors 
  No. Treated No. Control ATT Std. Error t-Statistic 
4893 1959 -0.069 0.018 -3.863 
          
Note: the numbers of treated and controls refer to actual nearest neigbor matches 
     ATTR 
    ATT estimation with the Radius Matching method 
Bootstrapped Standard Errors 
  No. Treated No. Control ATT Std. Error t-Statistic 
2959 2362 -0.074 0.024 -3.146 
          
Note: the numbers of treated and controls refer to actual matches within radius 
     ATTK 
    ATT estimation with the Kernel Matching method 
Bootstrapped Standard Errors 
  No. Treated No. Control ATT Std. Error t-Statistic 
4893 3882 -0.060 0.013 -4.507 
          
     ATTS 
    ATT estimation with the Stratification Matching method 
Bootstrapped Standard Errors 
  No. Treated No. Control ATT Std. Error t-Statistic 
5919 5080 -0.202 0.012 -16.925 
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Table 9: Bootstrapped Standard Errors for Model 2 using AISS Dataset 
ATTND 
    ATT estimation with Nearest Neighbor Matching method (random draw version) 
Bootstrapped Standard Errors 
  No. Treated No. Control ATT Std. Error t-Statistic 
651 273 0.091 0.056 1.637 
          
Note: the numbers of treated and controls refer to actual nearest neigbor matches 
     ATTR 
    ATT estimation with the Stratification Matching method 
Bootstrapped Standard Errors 
  No. Treated No. Control ATT Std. Error t-Statistic 
95 96 0.043 0.166 0.261 
          
Note: the numbers of treated and controls refer to actual matches within radius 
     ATTK 
    ATT estimation with the Kernel Matching method 
Bootstrapped Standard Errors 
  No. Treated No. Control ATT Std. Error t-Statistic 
651 491 0.052 0.034 1.509 
          
     ATTS 
    ATT estimation with the Stratification Matching method 
Bootstrapped Standard Errors 
  No. Treated No. Control ATT Std. Error t-Statistic 
672 494 0.059 0.032 1.832 
          
 
 
  
41 
 
Annex IV: Number of Treated and Control Groups Estimated 
Table 10: Inferior Bound, Number of Treated and Controls for Each Block  
Model 1 
    
Model 2 
   
Inferior 
of block 
of p-
score 
Householder received 
a Starter Pack (TIP) as 
safety net from 
Government     
Inferior of 
block of p-
score 
Householder received both 
basal and top dressing 
subsidy fertilizer   
  No Yes Total     No Yes Total 
0.3 8 1 9   0.3 5 1 6 
0.35 569 344 913   0.35 40 29 69 
0.4 1356 958 2314   0.4 5 4 9 
0.45 997 919 1916   0.45 88 72 160 
0.5 671 796 1467   0.5 85 93 178 
0.55 451 551 1002   0.55 5 6 11 
0.6 420 740 1160   0.6 243 418 661 
0.65 267 641 908   0.65 23 49 72 
0.7 188 481 669           
0.75 97 335 432           
0.8 51 136 187           
0.85 5 17 22           
 Total  
         
5,080  
         
5,919  
   
10,999     Total             494             672     1,166  
         Note: the common support option has been selected Note: the common support option has been selected 
 
Table 11: Calculation of Propensity Scores Results 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Binary TIP 
 
aissf 
hhage 0.03 hhage 0.00 
  (0.00)***   (0.34) 
fhh 0.20 fhh -0.45 
  (0.00)***   (0.00)** 
    poor -0.67 
      (0.00)*** 
N 10999 N 1171 
pR-sq 0.042 R-sq   
Note: Balancing property is satisfied 
Marginal Effects; p-values in parenthesis 
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
="* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001" 
 
 
